

Gatwick Area Conservation Campaign (GACC)

9<sup>th</sup> June, 2025

Dear Secretary of State, Department for Transport

Please find our written submissions for the 9<sup>th</sup> June deadline in respect of the Gatwick DCO.

Yours faithfully,

Peter Barclay

Chair, Gatwick Area Conservation Campaign

## **SUMMARY**

This representation submitted by Gatwick Area Conservation Campaign (GACC) responds to the Secretary of State's (SoS) letter of 27 February 2025, stating that the SoS was minded to grant consent for the Northern Runway Project (NRP), subject to being satisfied on a number of matters, and the 28 April 2025 letter inviting further comment on the additional information submitted by Gatwick Airport Limited (GAL).

This representation addresses the following:

1. Policy, Need and Benefits
2. Greenhouse Gas EmissionsNoise
3. Surface Transport
4. Wastewater

For the reasons set out below, GACC's position remains unchanged. The DCO should not be granted and the ANPS should be revised before any decisions on major airport expansion, such as the NRP, are approved. The need case is unproven, and the calculation of benefits flawed. In contrast, the increase in greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) arising from an expanded airport weigh significantly against approval, particularly given the uncertainties arising from the high-ambition scenario and the need to align with 1.5 degrees of warming. No account appears to have been taken of the economic harm on other parts of the economy that will be required to cut GHG emissions faster and harder as a result of the NRP.

Policy requirements to demonstrate a continued reduction of noise and mitigation have not been met. Noise impacts will increase with no off setting, such as a ban on night flights. In relation to surface transport, inadequate funding has been proposed by GAL to achieve the modal shift from roads to public transport.

There is no adequate review mechanism in place to ensure GHG emissions, noise and surface transport targets remain on track. The only effective way to achieve these targets is to link them to the release of further slots. Similarly, pollution incidents as a result of a wastewater system that is already at capacity without even GAL reaching its baseline capacity is self-evidently not fit for purpose. Revised requirement 31 and the proposed GAL-TWUL agreement fail to adequately address this issue.

## 1. **POLICY, NEED AND BENEFITS**

### € **Policy**

The ANPS is considered by the ExA, and currently the Secretary of State, to be the starting point in policy terms for the Proposed Development.

The ANPS was designated in June 2018, following the Airports Commission's final report published on 1 July 2015. Paragraph 1.21 of the ANPS states:

*The Airports NPS covers development that is anticipated to be required by 2030 as well as other development required to support it. It will remain in place until it is withdrawn, amended or replaced. It will be reviewed, in accordance with the Planning Act 2008, when the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to do so. When considering whether to review the Airports NPS, the Secretary of State will look at whether there has been a significant change in any circumstances on which the policy was based and whether such change was anticipated when the Airports NPS was designated.*

Section 6 of the Planning Act 2008 requires the Secretary of State to review all or part of each NPS whenever the Secretary of State thinks it appropriate to do so, taking into consideration the factors set out in section (6)(3) of the 2008 Act.

The Secretary of State has indicated that a review of the ANPS will commence after Heathrow brings forward a proposal for a third runway (for example, government announcements of 29 and 30 January 2025), thereby acknowledging that the ANPS is already outdated. This is, in any event, self-evident. It is 7 years old and is based on evidence that was gathered by the Airports Commission over 10 years ago (between 2012 and 2015).

For the same reasons, the Making Best Use of Existing Runways policy ("MBU"), which was published alongside in the ANPS in June 2018, is also outdated, and cannot be relied upon. The MBU is similarly predicated upon the Airports Commission's Final Report, published in July 2015 (see, for example, para 1.5).

The policies do not support expansion at Gatwick, but are also outdated in two principal respects.

First, the ANPS pre-dates the COVID-19 pandemic, the introduction of the net zero target, the inclusion of international aviation in the carbon budgets and the seventh carbon budget, all of which cut across the policy position set out in the ANPS, and rationally require a different approach to aviation demand arising from legally binding environmental obligations.

Indeed, since the net zero duty was implemented in June 2019, the Climate Change Committee ("CCC") has consistently advised (in summary) that direct demand management

policy should be implemented to meet the net zero target (see: *R (Possible (The 10:10 Foundation)) v Secretary of State for Transport* [2025] EWHC 1101 (Admin), para 26).

The course of the CCC's advice has culminated in the seventh carbon budget. The CCC have advised that the Government must manage aviation demand now, so no airport growth is needed at least until after 2035, and only even then if sustainable aviation technologies deliver promised benefits. The CCC have called on the Government to scale back aviation growth until 2040. There is no need for airport expansion in order to accommodate the growth in passenger numbers accounted for in either the sixth or seventh carbon budget. However, even with this reduced growth, consistent with the seventh carbon budget, the CCC still expect aviation to cause more greenhouse gas emissions than any other sector by then.

Notwithstanding the clear imperative to reduce aviation demand, since the ANPS was designated, there has been development approval for significant aviation expansion across England (in particular, the re-opening of Manston Airport, as well as expansions at Luton, Stansted, London City, Bristol and Southampton airports.)

Secondly, and in any event (and as set out further below), reliance on the policies as supporting the need case for expansion at Gatwick is also irrational, or at the least, unsafe, given the significant expansion which also has been granted, that was not factored into the economic analysis underpinning the ANPS and MBU (primarily derived from the Airports Commission's 2015 report). It is therefore wrong, in principle, for the Secretary of State to rely upon the ANPS as demonstrating the need for aviation development in the South of England and at Gatwick.

No review of the ANPS has taken place since its designation in 2018. The Secretary of State declined to review the ANPS pursuant to a decision taken in 2021. Government policy has since 2021 been to consider whether to review Airports National Policy Statements every five years<sup>1</sup>.

A decision on the expansion of Gatwick Airport should therefore not be predicated on the basis of the outdated ANPS and MBU. The ANPS and MBU should not be taken into account, or at the least, given minimal weight insofar as they are considered to support the making of the DCO.

The Jet Zero Strategy merely baldly endorses the ANPS (and MBU) without those policies having been reviewed (such review having been put on hold pending the Jet Zero Strategy). In any event, as recognised by the Department for Transport's minded-to letter of 27 February 2025 (at para 31), both the Jet Zero Strategy and the Government's response to the seventh carbon budget make clear that expansion will only be supported where it is consistent with the Government's environmental obligations, and the legally binding net zero target. Neither the ANPS nor the MBU cast any light whatsoever on whether expansion

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<sup>1</sup> Planning Act 2008: Guidance on the process for carrying out a review of existing National Policy Statements - GOV.UK at para 11.

would be so compatible, and indeed, cannot do so because they were produced before the implementation of the relevant environmental obligations and net zero target.

There is simply no up to date policy which can be rationally relied upon in determining whether to grant consent for the NRP other than carbon budgets which point strongly against consent. Granting consent would be inconsistent with the seventh carbon budget, and (at the very least) would imperil the Secretary of State's compliance with the budget, and net zero target.

## **∩ Need and benefits analysis**

The argument presented by GAL in their 24 April 2025 letter appears simply that the SoS has granted greater weight to the need for the proposed development at other airports, and that the same should apply at Gatwick. No further evidence to counter the position set out by the ExA has been provided. Therefore, we consider that GAL has little to challenge the position set out by the ExA in this regard.

The comparisons GAL has made in its letter to the SoS with other airports would seem a strange comparison to make, not least because each planning application should be considered independently, on its own merits. Both the ExA and SoS (Minded-to Letter, 27 Feb 2025, paragraph 40 – which preceded the Luton decision) note that 'Stansted and Manston' are significantly different cases'. GACC note the following:

Stansted and Luton Airports have less overlap geographically with London Gatwick than London Heathrow, and would surely constrain future demand for travellers from Gatwick who live in and north of London.

London City has a far greater focus on business travellers, which would constitute a more significant quantum of 'economic benefit' than Gatwick, whereas the increase in business passengers forecast at Gatwick has still not been properly evidenced for Gatwick by the Applicant.

Since the approval of expansion at Luton and Stansted airports, the economic need and benefits for Gatwick expansion are reduced. This does not appear to have been acknowledged by GAL, nor was it taken into account in the ANPS.

Manston Airport is an entirely different proposition to expansion at Gatwick Airport. Manston is a proposed freight-only airport. In contrast, Gatwick generates a net export of tourism revenue. Inclusion of economic impact of the net export of tourism revenue further increases the negative economic value of Gatwick expansion to the UK.

That the SoS (Letter dated 27 February 2025, paragraph 43) agrees with the ExA that GAL must demonstrate that the need to expand is additional to, and different from that met by the North-West Runway scheme at Heathrow. GACC disputes that the Applicant has demonstrated this separate need.

GACC restate our previous challenge of the need case presented by GAL, supporting the case made by the New Economics Foundation that the Applicant's calculations are not based on a sound assessment or evidence base (**REP10-049**). NEF's corrections to the GAL modelling gives a (negative) net present value to society of -£1.2 billion and a central case leading again to a (negative) net present value of -£4.5 billion for the Gatwick Airport Northern Runway Project.

The main reason for the difference between GAL's and NEF's analysis is that NEF make a more modest and evidence-based assumption on future business travel growth, reflecting that there has been no (zero) increase in business purposes travel for the UK as a whole since 2006. The NPV analysis by GAL is still based on unsubstantiated estimates of future business travel, despite this evidence being requested both at WR4 and WR8 during the DCO examination by NEF (**REP4-124** and **REP8-173**). The ExA reference this lack of evidence of any net additional business passenger growth [as assumed by the Applicant's assessment] in paragraph 10.2.46 of the ExA report to the SoS.

In addition, GAL have failed to include the DfT and BEIS-approved adjustment for non-CO2 emissions (not even in their most recent submission on 24 April 2025) which increases the environmental cost of the scheme by a further £4bn. Curiously, GAL chose to restate in their 24 April 2025 letter that the scheme generates additional GVA of inbound tourism *whilst completely omitting* to similarly quantify the far greater GVA (economic dis-benefit) of outbound tourism from Gatwick, which would highlight that Gatwick has a far greater negative GVA from exporting tourism than for UK airports as a whole.

In addition, the ExA analysis fails to take account of a scenario in which expansion takes place but demand management measures are subsequently required because of an inability to meet carbon reduction targets. In this scenario, the emissions associated with constructing and operating an expanded Gatwick (albeit to a more limited extent) will have been incurred but the benefits assumed to arise from increased flights will be lower than envisaged.

## U Impact of Eurostar on Need Case

Eurostar has announced expansion of Eurostar routes direct from London, with plans to almost triple capacity for train travel to mainland Europe by 2030. This was announced both prior to and reiterated since the DCO examination.

Eurostar passengers from London climbed back up to almost 19 million in 2023.<sup>2</sup> Eurostar and Thalys have recently merged and aligned timetables, which reduces journey times from London to destinations on the Brussels - Cologne - Dortmund high-speed train line.<sup>3</sup> This already represents a significant overlap between Eurostar direct and indirect destinations in Western Europe and flights taken from London and the UK, as set out in **Table 1**.

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<sup>2</sup> [https://mediacentre.eurostar.com/mc\\_view?language=&article\\_Id=ka4Rz000002KzmBIAS](https://mediacentre.eurostar.com/mc_view?language=&article_Id=ka4Rz000002KzmBIAS)

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.eurostar.com/rw-en/about-eurostar/thalys-becomes-eurostar>.

In early 2024 Eurostar announced that it has the potential – and intention – to increase its passenger numbers from the current 18.6 million passengers per year, by a factor of 2.5.<sup>4</sup> Later in 2024 the Eurotunnel infrastructure owner stated that it was actively pursuing increased use of the tunnel for LeShuttle and freight trains as well as rail services from London.<sup>5</sup> A more recent announcement set out potential destinations from London St Pancras to include destinations in Germany, Switzerland and Italy.<sup>6</sup> Eurostar has stated it aims “To make rail travel the preferred transport option to the continent,” and intend to “actively collaborate” with governments on the environmental benefits of rail journeys under six hours.

Such an increase in UK-EU rail travel will directly impact the Need Case for Gatwick expansion, by providing new routes with a viable alternative to flying, and reducing the demand (and therefore Need Case) for air travel on existing routes from London to Europe served by train. **Table 1** below highlights that the capacity increase planned by Eurostar matches the *total current volume of all of the flights from all London airports to France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg* - an extra 20 million passengers a year. The impact of increased Eurostar services do not appear to have been addressed in the ExA report.

**Table 1. Extent of Overlap between UK aviation passengers and potential destinations reached from London and the UK by Train (2023)**

	million passengers per year
<b>UK and London flight passengers in 2023</b>	
Total UK departing passengers in 2023	257.0
Of which - domestic passengers	238.5
- international passengers	18.6
Total London departing passengers in 2023	167.8
Of which - domestic passengers	156.9
- international passengers	10.9
London flights to Western Europe (area 1)	77.9

<sup>4</sup> See Eurostar (24<sup>th</sup> January 2024) Eurostar: Exceptional Growth in 2023, on the way for 30 million passengers by 2030. [https://mediacentre.eurostar.com/mc\\_view?language=&article\\_Id=ka4Rz000002KzmBIAS](https://mediacentre.eurostar.com/mc_view?language=&article_Id=ka4Rz000002KzmBIAS)

<sup>5</sup> Katanich D (6<sup>th</sup> May 2024) Eurotunnel operator offers cash to attract new cross-channel services. <https://www.euronews.com/business/2024/05/06/eurotunnel-operator-offers-cash-to-attract-new-cross-channel-services#:~:text=The%20FT%20reports%20that%20a,offsetting%20the%20initial%20high%20costs.>

<sup>6</sup> Eurostar announcement on plans to almost triple Eurostar capacity by 2030: <https://www.euronews.com/travel/2025/02/24/london-to-europe-by-train-new-expanded-routes-could-bring-wallet-and-pet-friendly-travel>.

London flights to Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, France and Germany	20.3
London flights to Eurostar cities (including Thalys line to Dortmund)	7.6
London flights to Eurostar cities direct from London (Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam)	6.3

Source for 2023 Aviation passenger numbers: <https://www.caa.co.uk/data-and-analysis/uk-aviation-market/airports/uk-airport-data/uk-airport-data-2023/annual-2023/>.

**Table 1** also highlights that a further 10 million London airport passengers are flying from London to UK domestic airports, most of which are within reasonable travel distance to London by train. However, it has now been demonstrated that the rail system can match journey times to most major domestic destinations with significant reductions in carbon emissions (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Manchester and other main cities, which should have reduced journey times from HS2 and other rail investments). The potential to manage aviation demand by switching travel from flights to train from London to other UK cities also appears not to have been considered.

GACC are concerned that the even though the Project is noted as generating significant harm from future Greenhouse Gas emissions that cannot be mitigated against, the wider Need for the Project has not been considered. Need must be assessed in the context of the net zero target, and the seventh carbon budget. In other words, is there a need for the NRP in the net zero pathway to 2050? Plainly, the answer is no.

In any event, the Need Case should first consider demand management and then sustainable transport alternatives to flying. GACC propose that instead of predicting a need for increased flights (in isolation) there should be a wider assessment of Need that first focuses on whether the demand some journeys might be negated (such as through more UK holidays, directly generating UK economic growth) or made by more sustainable modes (such as by Eurostar to current or more closer destinations).

Choosing to meet Need by expanding Eurostar first alongside other demand management measures would substantially reduce the overall 'Need Case' for aviation growth at Gatwick and other UK airports. GACC call on the Secretary of State to prioritise sustainable travel options first, which would be consistent with the advice of the Government's Climate Change Committee's Seventh Carbon Budget Report (February 2025) to reduce demand for flying.<sup>7</sup>

Climate Change Committee's Seventh Carbon Budget Report  
<https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/The-Seventh-Carbon-Budget.pdf> (Key messages for Aviation Sector, page 222). The CCC have advised Government that it must manage aviation demand now, so no airport growth is needed at least until after 2035, and only even then if sustainable aviation technologies deliver promised benefits. They have called on the Government to scale back aviation growth until 2040, but even with this reduced growth the CCC still expect aviation to cause more greenhouse gas emissions than any other sector by then.

GACC assert that factoring in increases to Eurostar, modal shift to train travel not just for journeys to Gatwick but journeys from Gatwick, and choosing to support these more sustainable travel options would limit the Need for aviation growth. Just as the Secretary of State has decided to delay a final decision on Gatwick until there is clarity on Heathrow's expansion plans, GACC suggest the Secretary of State should first consider the impact of Eurostar (and expanding UK train travel) on London's aviation market.



## **2. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS**

GACC note that the ExA concludes (in paragraph 8.5.13 of their report):

That the Development's emissions would have a material impact on the Government's ability to comply with its carbon reduction targets such that the current mitigation measures cannot be considered acceptable; and

That the Proposed Development would not contribute to radical reductions in GHG emissions as required by the NPPF (ExA report paragraph references NPPF (2023) paragraph 157 which is now NPPF (2025) paragraph 161).

These are both critical and damning conclusions, with which GACC agree. The Secretary of State cannot grant development consent without addressing, head on, how the material impact on the Government's ability to meet net zero will be addressed. For the reasons set out below, the Jet Zero Strategy does not provide an escape route. It is necessary to undertake quantitative analysis on the effect of the specific proposal on the Government's ability to meet the seventh carbon budget, and to consider that against the quantified effect of the Jet Zero Strategy relied upon.

What the ExA does not consider is the impact of the unmitigated increase in GHG emissions on the remainder of the UK economy, which will have to reduce GHG emissions to a greater extent in order to reach Net Zero. An analysis of the economic impact on other sectors of the UK economy is not available and does not appear to have been considered by the ExA or the Secretary of State.

GAL contends that the greenhouse gas emissions considered should only relate to the Proposed Development. This view ignores both the increase in emissions between the current emissions and future baseline – and the significance of the scale of existing emissions associated with Gatwick Airport. GACC contend:

That all increases in emissions from the current level of emissions at the Airport should be considered; and

That the Airport's current scale of unmitigated greenhouse gas emissions is relevant and significant.

GACC have updated our estimation of the significance of Gatwick Airport and the NRP on future UK carbon budgets. This is presented in tables in Annex 1 of this representation.

GAL also assert that the climate impact of the Project is not significant as it does not cross the 5% threshold of significance in the IEMA guidance.<sup>8</sup> GACC disagree and contend that the significance of aviation's climate impact should include consideration of all of the ways in which aviation has a climate impact, and should be judged against compliance with a 1.5°C climate resilient development pathway, for which the IEMA guidance seeks to achieve. GACC contend that, in any case:

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<sup>8</sup> Paragraph 7.10 of Annex 4 of 24 April 2025 submission.

- ⊖ The UK's assessment of capital projects such as this must comply with the Paris Climate Agreement and as Gatwick Airport is already a significant emitter, and is proposing to increase greenhouse emissions further, at odds with the need to fully decarbonise the economy. With reference to Figure 8.120 in the ExA report, Gatwick's planned expansion is clearly outside of the 1.5°C compliant trajectory, so this alone results in it having 'moderate adverse' impacts, even before the significance of the Project emissions are considered;
- ⊖ IEMA guidance requires assessments to consider the certainty of mitigation proposals and whether they are realistic and achievable. Neither Gatwick nor the government have carried out any such assessment. It is highly likely that an IEMA assessment would conclude that the Jet Zero assumptions relied upon by GAL are subject to significant uncertainty, not supported by credible evidence, inconsistent with the precautionary principle and beyond the Government's and the applicant's control. Consequently, Gatwick's mitigation assumptions do not comply with IEMA guidance and should be reassessed on a compliant basis;
- ⊖ When properly contextualising the Project's climate impact against UK carbon budgets, and within the aviation sector itself, the Project, without excluding any of its climate impacts, exceeds the 5% threshold in the IEMA guidance, so the submissions are considered significant; and
- ⊖ In line with the precautionary principle, many of these emissions are uncertain (due to assumptions in the Jet Zero strategy) and it is also uncertain that they will be mitigated (by carbon removal technologies). In part this is because the High Ambition scenario used by GAL to estimate future greenhouse gas emissions is not the worst-case one (and instead, is a highly unlikely scenario – predicated, as it is, on nascent future technologies). A likely or expected scenario should also have been considered. This means there is a significant risk that there are considerable levels of unmitigated emissions as a result of the Proposed Development, which will imperil compliance with the net zero target.

GACC have updated our estimation of the significance of Gatwick Airport and the NRP on future UK carbon budgets. This is presented in tables in Annex 1 of this representation.

The carbon impact of the NRP should therefore be judged as significant as:

- i) It will result in a large increase in emissions whilst the rest of the economy is required to reduce emissions, so is clearly not aligned to the Paris Climate Agreement;
- ii) The increase in emissions is significant both nationally and within the aviation sector; and
- iii) This increase poses a significant risk that the UK will not meet its carbon targets and introduces an unacceptable level of uncertainty at odds with the Precautionary Principle.

As noted above, the ExA report includes an extract from the IEMA guidance (Figure 8.120), which shows that GHG emissions that fall outside of the 1.5°C compliant trajectory are moderately adverse and that which is significantly outside this trajectory to be major adverse. GACC contend that the Greenhouse Gas Emissions of this scheme, **increase emissions by a significant amount, when emissions should be reduced**, so should be judged as **major adverse**, and similarly this should be judged as giving "**major weight**" against the proposed development in the planning balance. This is also a logical

conclusion, seeing as the proposed development would lead to one of the largest net negative impacts on the climate of any decision taken in the UK in the 21<sup>st</sup> century to-date; with no mitigations proposed that would remove that impact.

### **3. NOISE**

We are extremely concerned about some of the proposals made by the ExA, the SoS's views on those proposals and the further proposals submitted by the Applicant in its additional information.

In particular, we consider that the Air Noise Limits, both as proposed by the ExA and as amended by the Applicant, would be a gross departure from national aircraft noise policy in both the short and long terms. They would have extensive harmful effects for local communities and those under flight paths. The extent of these harmful effects has not been taken into account.

In our view both the ExA's and the Applicant's proposals fail to comply with policy in the following key respects.

#### **a. Sharing of benefits**

The Aviation Policy Framework (APF) states that, *"as a general principle, the Government therefore expects that future growth in aviation should ensure that benefits are shared between the aviation industry and local communities. This means that the industry must continue to reduce and mitigate noise as airport capacity grows."*

In addition, the ANPS says that noise envelopes must *"... achieve a balance between growth and noise reduction"*.

None of the current noise envelope proposals deliver the APF policy principles or achieve a balance between growth and noise reduction as required by the ANPS.

As regards the requirement that the benefits of growth should be shared, it is unquestionably the case that none of the current proposals achieve this goal. The airport projects that it would benefit from very significant growth as compared to historic and baseline positions while communities would suffer substantial increases in noise compared to the baseline. The test that the benefits of growth should be shared is not currently met in any plausible way. In its Report the ExA has made an attempt to assess whether the benefits of future technological improvements are being shared but has made no assessment of whether overall benefits are being shared, as both the Aviation Policy Framework and the ANPS require. This is a material oversight and a misinterpretation of policy.

In addition, the Aviation Policy Framework test that noise should reduce as capacity grows is not met by current proposals. The applicant's Central Case baseline forecast (i.e. without the development) is that the 2029 Leq 16 hour Day 51 dB contour will cover 120.1 km<sup>2</sup>. For the

initial five-year period following opening of the northern runway the ExA and the SoS have proposed a Leq 16 hour Day 51 dB noise envelope limit of 125 km<sup>2</sup> and the Applicant has propose a limit of 135km<sup>2</sup>. Both these limits are an increase on the baseline position.

No other noise benefits are proposed. Therefore, the policy requirements for noise to reduce as capacity grows and for the benefits of growth to be shared is not achieved by any of the current proposals.

**In order to be policy compliant day and night period noise limits should reduce from the baseline position as airport capacity increases (consistent with GACC's previous proposals). In addition, harm caused by noise must be mitigated and the benefits of growth shared, for example by a ban on night flights.**

Notwithstanding the above, if the SoS intends to accept the general arrangements proposed by the ExA (which GACC does not accept is policy compliant) she should in no circumstances increase the 51 dB LAeq 16h limit of 125 km<sup>2</sup> and she should mandate a lower limit for years 6 -10 together with a review mechanism thereafter (see detailed comments on the review process below).

#### **b. Night flights**

The ExA and SoS have proposed night period noise limits broadly consistent with those suggested by the applicant. If these limits were implemented the SoS would have removed the possibility of banning night flights as a means of striking a balance between the aviation industry and local communities, and made it virtually impossible to achieve outcomes consistent with government noise policy.

The ANPS requires a ban on scheduled night flights between 11pm and 7am if Heathrow was to develop a third runway. The ANPS is clearly stated to be an important and relevant consideration for applications for any airport nationally significant infrastructure project in the South East of England, not just Heathrow. Indeed, the ExA specifically raised the question of a ban on night flights as proposed in the ANPS during the inquiry.

Despite this, the ExA failed to include any discussion of the requirement in its report. By making specific reference to a night flight ban in the ANPS, Parliament has made clear that relying solely on future government night flight restrictions is not a sufficient measure and does not provide sufficient community protection where an airport is seeking consent for major expansion.

We also note that the proposed summer night period limits provide headroom for additional night flights in the summer period and offer no protection in the winter period.

**The SoS should mandate a ban on night flights as a condition to any approval of the DCO. In addition, the SoS should require that a comprehensive package of measures is put in place to incentivise the use of the quietest aircraft at night outside the hours of a ban, as also required by the ANPS.**

### **c. Noise level certainty**

We understand that the SoS's noise limit proposals relate to the 92-day summer period 16 June to 15 September inclusive. If that is the case, they do not satisfy the APF requirement that noise envelopes should give communities certainty about future levels of noise, because there would be no restrictions on noise outside the core summer period. Instead, noise levels would be completely unlimited for 75% of the year including extremely busy times such as Easter, Christmas and the Autumn holidays. That would be both wholly unacceptable to communities and wholly non-compliant with policy.

**The noise envelope requirements should cover all periods of the year, providing for policy compliant reduction in noise and benefit sharing at all times, or delivering alternative benefits, such as a ban on night flights.**

### **d. Inappropriate metrics**

The ExA's and SoS's proposed noise envelope uses a single, average noise, metric, Leq. It is widely accepted that Leq does not portray aircraft noise as experienced by communities, and all relevant policy and guidance advises against its use as a sole metric.

The APF says, "*... we recommend that average noise contours should not be the only measure used when airports seek to explain how locations under flight paths are affected by aircraft noise.*"

The CAA's noise envelope guidance, CAP 1129, recommends using a "*combination of parameters*" and states that "*where unilateral agreement cannot be achieved using standard metrics, consideration should be given to designing envelopes using other metrics provided that they are scientifically valid and robust*".

The ANPS requires noise envelopes to be tailored to local priorities and to be defined in consultation with local communities.

The SoS's proposed noise envelope metrics do not meet any of these tests.

**Any noise envelope should include a suite of metrics and limits to be agreed with all stakeholders.**

### **e. Noise envelope limit reviews**

The ExA and SoS have proposed noise limits that would apply in years one to five and from the sixth year of dual runway operations but removed any provision for reviews of those limits thereafter.

That is an extraordinary position for the ExA and the SoS to take. Every stakeholder involved in the inquiry, including the Applicant, proposed that there should be a process for

renewing noise envelope limits periodically with a general expectation that limits would reduce over time. The ExA initially endorsed that view and made specific recommendations in that respect.

The ExA's rationale for dropping the requirement that there should be a review mechanism appears to be that noise reductions beyond year five are increasingly uncertain. This is inconsistent with the government's view, which is that it expects aircraft noise to continue to decline, and with the views recently expressed by Sustainable Aviation on behalf of the aviation industry.

Failure to mandate a review mechanism would also undermine one of the government's objectives for noise, namely that they should create incentives for the industry to reduce noise. Without a mechanism to require longer term noise reductions, there would be no incentive for Gatwick to continue to reduce noise.

Finally, the absence of a review mechanism is wholly incompatible with the ANPS which specifically states that "suitable review periods should be set in consultation with the parties mentioned above [local communities and relevant stakeholders] to ensure that the noise envelope framework remains relevant". In the absence of a review process, the proposed framework would cease to be relevant within a few years. The ExA's and SoS's proposals wholly ignore this requirement.

Failure to mandate a review mechanism would mean that the noise limits at Gatwick would become out of date and ineffective with no means for updating them. That would be a wholly irresponsible approach to policy delivery and entirely unacceptable to communities around the airport.

**The SoS should engage with all stakeholders to develop an agreed review mechanism.**

It would be particularly unacceptable to allow the Applicant to request reviews of the noise envelope limits in the way it has proposed, which would inevitably increase noise and community impacts, but not to allow other interested parties to request reviews or to mandate a broader review process as favoured by virtually all parties.

#### **4. SURFACE TRANSPORT**

##### **€ Background Points on Surface Transport Modelling**

This section addresses GACC's understanding of the main components of the overall structure applied to the assessment of the Northern Runway project in terms of surface transport.

The surface transport modelling process involves aiming to create base models that replicate current demand flows, journey times, delays and crowding on the existing network, at a

level of accuracy that meets the Department for Transport's Transport Analysis Guidance (TAG). Expected changes in the main factors that influence demand are then applied in future year versions of the current year model to estimate how demand, times, delays and crowding will change to create future projections for the project forecast years. This process should follow modelling standards, which are set out in TAG.

## ▮ **Overall Modelling Structure Applied to the Northern Runway Project**

The modelling structure applied to the Northern Runway project includes:

**Demand model.** This estimates how travellers will change their behaviour in response to changes in travel costs relative to the base model. This includes the overall scale of demand and how the demand is allocated to different modes of travel. Travel costs are mainly time-based, including travel time and congestion. The behavioural responses include changes in destinations or modes, such as switching from car to public transport.

**Assignment models.** There are three assignment models, representing the road network, rail network and the bus and coach network serving the airport. The process normally involves the creation of demand matrices by the demand model for each of these main modes, with the approach matrix then fed into the associated assignment model. The assignment models then estimate the routes and generate statistics about the impacts, including level of demand, travel times, crowding and delay.

**Simulation models.** These represent specific parts of the infrastructure in detail, such as the operation of highway junctions.

The models include existing and established models or are built from existing models, including models used by Transport for London.

## ▮ **Comments on GAL Modelling**

### *Plausibility of Modelled Mode Shares*

GACC have reviewed the surface transport modelling approach and outcomes. The modelled modal shift appears to be mainly driven by modelled increases to drop-off and on-airport parking charges, as well as overall increases of road network delays – against already planned increases in rail capacity, and some bus and coach investment.

The modelling reports provide the following explanations for the forecasting showing a shift from highway demand to sustainable travel.

There is a significant reduction in car and increase in public transport/coach shares for both air passengers and airport employees, which are attributed to the surface access strategy measures.

The reductions in car mode share and increases in public transport mode share are the result of escalation in real terms of car parking and forecourt access charges in the future baseline, plus improvements to rail and bus/coach frequencies, while highway times generally deteriorate.

GACC reiterate our earlier submissions that the modelling baseline assumptions should be independently sense checked, so that the plausibility of the modelled outcomes could be judged. The overall changes in each of the main factors should have been set out, so they could have been compared. Whilst it is recognised that the models provide the best way to process multiple data inputs and data interactions, they are not infallible and provide an approximation of real outcomes. Tabulated data for base year and forecasting years without and with the project should show the underlying assumptions that have been made – not least the modelled levels of car parking and forecourt access charges, highway journey times, rail capacity on key routes in terms of seat and standing capacity, and the overall change in bus/coach frequencies for different key transport corridors, plus any other data that underpins these outcomes.

In addition, GACC are not convinced by the modelled assumptions on changes to airport forecourt pick-up and drop off, and on-airport parking charges. Specific figures are given for 2032 and modelling states that these are increased by RPI: which means it basically stays the same. The modelled future on-airport car parking charges and forecourt charges should be disclosed, not least to inform future monitoring.

#### *Sensitivity Testing of Variations in Planning Data*

GACC remain concerned that, like all models, the demand model is only as good as the input data. It is not clear that there has been any sensitivity analysis through a broader origin-demand testing as part of the transport modelling, nor included in the proposal by GAL to replace the revised Requirement 20 (Surface Access) with a fixed limit on annual air passenger vehicle trips.

When forecasting to 2047, the scale and pattern of origins and destinations is subject to significant uncertainty. The demand for Gatwick will vary according to whether and when other competitor airports expand, how their slots are utilised, and the relative scale in growth across different parts of Gatwick's catchment area.

Crucially, Gatwick's mode share by public transport appears highly dependent on use of the airport of those living in London. Increase in travel from the West and East of Gatwick, which has poorer public transport links, looks more problematic without major public transport capacity increases, which requires capital investment absent from GAL's DCO application. The possibility that this might happen over the next 20+ years and change the desirability of rail (and bus/coach) access to the airport by Gatwick's (different) passenger mix is a risk, and it is this reason why we believe a stronger Requirement 20 is required.

The decision as to whether or when Heathrow Airport (and other London Airports including the significant expansion planned for Luton) expands will have an impact on the scale of



demand for Gatwick and the demand on the surface transport networks. This could significantly impact on the locations that Gatwick passengers travel from, and this could change with time.

Another aspect that appears overlooked is changes to the scale of population growth at key origins and destinations such as London. For example, the new Government housing targets have reduced demand growth in London and other large urban areas, and increased housing targets for other areas across the South East. This alone will affect the likely origin of passengers travelling from the Airport, against assumptions made during the DCO planning examination.

GACC remain concerned that the SACs cannot simply be expected to be predicted by a single combination of transport models, and then realised, but there are many reasons why the propensity to use car or sustainable travel modes to Gatwick might be different to that modelled. GACC are concerned that these potential variations have not been fully represented in sensitivity testing as part of the DCO application, such that there is a need to both a) provide greater rail and other sustainable transport capacity and b) have stronger mechanisms to ensure that the SACs are met, as proposed by the ExA in the revised Requirement 20 of the DCO.

**[. Comments on GAL's 24 April 2025 Letter: Response to the Secretary of State's Letter dated 27th February 2025**

*Surface Access (Requirement 20)*

GAL state that it has a strong track record in investing in public transport initiatives and refers to its contribution of over £40m to the recently improved Gatwick Airport Railway Station. Of course, that is a welcomed and necessary improvement, but there is also a requirement to address the future shortfall in rail service capacity. Having established that investing in station capacity was the right thing to do, why hasn't this been extended to service capacity when GAL's own modelling shows an increase in the number of passengers standing because of their Northern Runway project? GAL is relying on railway service improvements provided by the rail industry, and which were not planned to accommodate additional demand from airport expansion (see **Annex 2** setting out the scale of investment needed for rail network capacity upgrades to the Brighton Mainline and wider rail network South of London).

GAL states that a monitoring process is sufficient so there is no need for a hard backstop, such as in the proposed change to Requirement 20.

GAL argues that the amendments to Requirement 20 proposed by the ExA are unnecessary. GAL states that there are factors, which are not within its control. GACC dispute this. GAL's objection appears disingenuous. If GAL is confident that their planned approach will be delivered then there should be no need to object to the revision to Requirement 20. GACC consider that GAL should provide funding to support the delivery of those factors, especially

rail capacity improvements, but has chosen not to. Indeed, target 3 in Gatwick Airport's Area Access Study 2022-2030 (published October 2022, page 5) is to "Challenge the rail industry to help us achieve a 50% rail mode share for airport passengers by 2030, compared with 41% in 2019, which would help us exceed our public transport target." The position stated by GAL here contradicts the target that they have already committed to in their own access study.<sup>9</sup>

GAL could also contribute to a reduction in public transport fares for Gatwick users, to encourage a switch from cars. Also, if GAL considered that factors not within its control were a significant risk to delivery of its mode shares, then this should have been taken into account in its sensitivity testing and presented in the DCO documentation so that it could be fully considered and discussed by all participants at the hearings.

GAL have suggested an amendment to Requirement 20, which would involve a 'passenger cars on the road' limit of no more than 24 million cars per year (the level forecast in the TA). GAL claim that this measure, unlike mode share, is more directly in GAL's control. A further amendment that GAL also proposes is a final test involving the completion of the highway improvement works prior to first use of the northern runway. Our view is that this is an inadequate alternative to the ExA's recommended form of Requirement 20, as it does not necessarily deliver the target mode shares. The amount of cars on the road is only one determinant of the mode share; the amount of travel by sustainable modes is also a determinant. Therefore, in our view the GAL alternative wording should be rejected in favour of the ExA's recommended form of Requirement 20.

GACC expand on this setting out three reasons why GAL's alternative should be objected to:

- i. If GAL can cope with setting a fixed number of cars on the road, it could translate the SAC mode share commitments into a number of cars on the road as a result of the airport and use this approach to manage the road traffic levels. This could be done with the existing SACs, and revision of Requirement 20 of the DCO as proposed by the ExA, and accepted in the 'minded to' letter by the SoS as providing a *realistic mechanism* to ensure the SACs are met.
- ii. Should GAL not expand the number of flights so much then this will result in a lower % share of public transport to the airport. The commitment to surface access should remain, regardless of the scale of increase of air travel that results.
- iii. The revised proposal by GAL sets out no way to address a fall in sustainable transport mode share after the new highway improvements are completed and the new runway is opened. The airport must retain its commitment after this date and have a mechanism to achieve agreed SACs after this date.

GAL describes the highway improvements as a backstop measure. This implies they need not be provided. However, once they are provided they are no longer a backstop but real. They will dis-incentivise shift to sustainable modes, *not just for traffic to/from Gatwick, but for all other surface traffic in the Gatwick area.*

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<sup>9</sup> [https://www.gatwickairport.com/on/demandware.static/-/Sites-Gatwick-Library/default/dw1d34163e/images/Corporate-PDFs/Sustainability/Surface-access-reports/Surface\\_access\\_strategy.pdf](https://www.gatwickairport.com/on/demandware.static/-/Sites-Gatwick-Library/default/dw1d34163e/images/Corporate-PDFs/Sustainability/Surface-access-reports/Surface_access_strategy.pdf).

GAL argue that it 'should not create additional stress on the highway network' so are proposing 'a number of highway improvement works'. However, it is clear that there is additional congestion on train services, which would be created but no comparable investment in public transport is proposed. Indeed, the overall rationale for investing in an increase in road network capacity but not rail is not clear.<sup>10</sup> The SACs proposed by GAL would result in a net increase in road traffic around the airport, which is reflected in the proposed £350 million of road network improvements. However, it would also result in a *far greater* increase in rail travel, while the level of rail investment is capped at £10 million, and no specific investment in rail network capacity is proposed. The significant scale of increase in annual passenger numbers proposed (a near doubling) should be matched by a step change in public transport accessibility from current levels.

GAL have restated their previous point that somehow by having the SACs Gatwick has made a commitment to a modal shift. GACC respond, as previously, that only by ensuring that it is delivered, as the ExA's recommended form of Requirement 20 seeks, would this be a *real* commitment.

GAL says that residual concerns about the lower baseline producing greater impacts than assessed in the ES, is mitigated by the £10m Transport Mitigation Fund, Rail Enhancement Fund and Sustainable Transport Fund. GAL states that the increase in rail travel to/from the airport is insignificant. GACC disputes this, highlighting the levels of overcrowding modelled. We are unclear whether the impacts of the lower baseline have been sufficiently addressed and, therefore, whether these funds would be sufficient to address any impacts (as noted in **Annex 2**). GACC contend that there remains a high risk that these funds leave a significant risk that the SACs are not met, as the potential level of funding in rail and other sustainable transport provision should be at least the same order of magnitude as the levels of investment required to substantially uplift rail capacity on the Brighton Mainline (BML) and wider network capacity to encourage a freeing up of BML capacity. GAL relies on existing planned improvements by Network Rail with no increase in rail capacity considered in the Project case. Similarly, additional bus and coach routes are said to be funded but the frequency and viability of these appears not to be modelled.

GACC also highlight the lack of clarity in paragraph 5.22 of GAL's letter which we view as having phrasing that is ambiguous: *"The applicant and its shareholders will not be able to justify investment in the construction of the Proposed Development at a cost of over £2bn if the Applicant were not permitted to operate the northern runway even where it had delivered its highway mitigation works and/or vehicular traffic on the network was less than had been modelled as acceptable in the TA/ES."*

GACC, reassert, as previously proposed at **REP8-152**, that achievement of the SACs (Requirement 20 of the DCO), remaining within the allocated carbon budget (which should include flight impacts) and meeting the noise envelope requirements, should all be linked to

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<sup>10</sup> GACC's original objection to GAL's surface transport proposals were that GAL cap of passenger cars at current levels – allowing **no further increase in road traffic due to airport expansion**. This would negate the need for the highway improvements, meaning that scale of investment by GAL could contribute to enhancing rail network capacity and public transport provision instead.

the annual permission from government to allocate slots at the airport: only when noise limits, carbon limits and surface access mode share are met should the airport be permitted to operate those flights which lead to these impacts.

*GACC Reassert Request for All Off-Airport Parking to be treated as unsustainable transport (i.e. excluded from sustainable transport mode share).*

The side effect of using parking charges as the main way to reduce modelled airport surface access by car, could be to increase off-airport (both on- and off- street) parking in areas already blighted by this problem, with no clear indication from GAL as to the scale of this problem in future, or how it will be mitigated.

The sustainable transport mode share should be clarified so that it defines and leads to monitoring of the actual modal share for the overall journey to/from the airport by both passengers and staff. This should not be just assessing how passengers arrive in the 'final mile' or so to the airport, but whether the journey as a whole is via sustainable (active or public – walking, cycling, bus, coach and train) rather than unsustainable (predominately car) travel. Car sharing will reduce the amount of cars travelling to the airport, and should be encouraged, but not count in the shift to sustainable modes. Higher on airport parking charges might incentivise more off-airport parking but this should not constitute a sustainable journey and be factored into a mode share. For example:

A journey made by car of 50-95% of the distance to the airport, and then a train or bus from where a passenger have parked a car off-airport might reduce need for airport parking, and shift travel from the strategic road network immediately around the airport but is not a predominantly sustainable transport journey, so should not be counted as such.

In contrast, driving to be dropped at a station near where a passenger lives and then catching a train or bus or coach the majority of the distance to the airport should be judged as a modal shift.

The 24 April 2025 response from GAL (still) proposes to measure sustainable transport share as that which arrives at the airport. This risks including off-airport parking where the last leg is bus or train being treated as sustainable travel. *In GACC's view unauthorised off-airport parking should also be included so that it can also be discouraged through the SACs.*

Therefore, GACC reaffirm our proposal that DfT clearly define in the DCO agreement what a sustainable transport journey entails in a way, as suggested above, that aligns to how sustainable transport is commonly defined elsewhere.

## **5. WASTEWATER**

GACC views the revised form of Requirement 31 as inadequate, as is the lack of even preliminary modelling of Horley and Crawley Sewage Treatment Works (STW) future capacity needs both with and without the Gatwick Northern Runway Project.

## Key Concerns Arising from Evidence

- € **Lack of Preliminary modelling and regulatory requirement to set out future wastewater treatment and flow capacity around Gatwick Airport is unacceptable.**

Normally TWUL would carry out flow modelling of the impact of major new housing developments. The lack of any such modelling for a major national planning consent which has been in development and prolonged planning examination is completely unacceptable. It is unclear why TWUL appears not to have modelled, even on a preliminary basis, the effect of increased flows from Gatwick expansion on Horley STW's compliance with the Environmental Permitting Regulations and Water Framework Directive. GACC would expect the Government, potentially through oversight of the Environment Agency to step in and require this to be provided. It is our view that this planning determination must be informed by clearly evidencing the level of future capacity needed (in both the baseline and with project case) to protect receiving water bodies in the context of increased load from airport expansion.

- ∩ **The revised form of Requirement 31 is therefore judged inadequate. It would embed, and therefore risks completely failing to address the Horley STW capacity shortfalls that still remain going forward.**

Crucially the new GAL-TWUL agreement reflects the capacity increase needed by Gatwick based on current rather than future STW capacity needs around the airport. It fails to acknowledge that current STW capacity is inadequate and that this will take 5+ years to address. And Requirement 31 agreement completely omits consideration of the need to plan for capacity to meet baseline Gatwick expansion and permitted/planned housing and other developments. This increased capacity needs to be planned for, and used to assess the adequacy of capacity to meet the Northern Runway Project. The GAL-TWUL agreement and revised form proposed for Requirement 31 look to continue the current failure to provide adequate water infrastructure around the airport, making the airport complicit in continuing TWUL's current failure. This failure risks being further exacerbated if the airport expansion is permitted. As set out below, it is expected that as future demand continues to increase (as a result of housing as well as Gatwick Airport's baseline case) *it would appear that TWUL plan to continue to operate the STWs around Gatwick with inadequate capacity for many years to come* – even without the potential need to accommodate Gatwick expansion. Permitting the expansion, and greenlighting this Requirement as being adequately met, would effectively lock in a failure in wastewater infrastructure provision for many years.

The need to address the current, pre-existing wastewater capacity gap **and** future need is set out in more detail below and in supporting evidence provided from River Mole River Watch (RMRW) included as **Annex 3** to this submission. **Annex 4** provides a short summary of the key points in the new GAL-TWUL agreement.

U **Current Sewage Treatment Works (STW) capacity is inadequate and will take 5+ years to address.**

Horley and Crawley STWs are not currently coping with existing loads. In addition, much of the local sewer network, including pumping stations, is not coping with existing loads. Ofwat has designated Horley STW a "Site of Concern". This means it has breached permits and is at risk from doing so in future. In recent years Horley STW has regularly discharged untreated sewage during rain events, including hazardous raw sewage flooding over public footpaths, into streets and local properties in Horley. TWUL have failed to address the persistent flooding and pollution issues at Horley STW for many years despite numerous engineering consultations and reports. It has taken sustained campaigning by River Mole River Watch (RMRW), local residents associations, councillors, and MPs to secure minor 'emergency works'. But this will only address gross sewage flooding on the nearby Westvale Park housing estate, not the long-term STW and sewer network capacity deficits. Indeed, TWUL only recently accepted the view of RMRW that 'river levels' are not the primary cause of plant surcharging, but inadequate plant capacity.

The three planned "upgrade" projects at Horley STW: (WAAP, Storm Overflow, and Phosphorus schemes) are only designed to bring the Horley plant into current permit compliance. According to TWUL's response to numerous previous developments, the network is already unable to accept additional loads (e.g. Pease Pottage WoodGate development in 2015). This raises doubts about the adequacy of current future capacity plans by TWUL, and TWUL's understanding of the core hydraulic constraints at this plant. GACC are concerned that any additional flows from Gatwick will impact on the effectiveness of current planned upgrades.

The delivery of these planned upgrades at Horley STW has already been delayed. In March 2025 TWUL confirmed that the earliest start date for these three projects is delayed a further year, to start in December 2026 at the earliest with planned completion in 2028 – 2030. Further slippage is possible not least because the three construction projects overlap. This means any *additional* capacity upgrades at Horley STW to accommodate future Gatwick and non-Gatwick related wastewater flows are, in our view, unlikely to start in the next five years, which would impact the DCO proposed timeframe.

f. **But this still will not deal with future capacity, either from the airport baseline (non-project case) or from other developments.**

As highlighted above, the current agreed STW upgrade projects are only planned to deal with the current shortfall and failings. It is unclear how the current scale of repeated permit breaches at Horley STW and its "site of concern" status have informed TWUL's assessment of its future hydraulic and treatment capacity shortfall, before the impact of Gatwick's proposed expansion is considered. TWUL's current planned upgrades only meet *current* shortfalls in capacity – so, crucially, they fail to account for **either** local housing or other non-airport related developments **or** future growth at Gatwick (including that in the Gatwick Northern Runway project baseline, even before the DCO project is considered). Planned TWUL projects are only designed to accommodate current loads so future growth from

**either** planned and consented housing schemes (e.g. 600 additional homes at Hookwood, 3000 houses planned West of Ifield) **or** additional flows from current Gatwick growth, or indeed additional Gatwick expansion is excluded. As these are not **all** reflected in the revision to Requirement 31 it appears flawed.

## **Annex 1**

### **Calculation of Significance of Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Gatwick Airport and the NRP on future UK carbon budgets**

This annex considers the overall level of significance of Gatwick Airport and the Northern Runway Project future greenhouse gas emissions. The calculations below compare GAL's calculations on GHG emissions and the impact of including (a) Well to Tank emissions; b) non-CO2 effects, c) arriving as well as departing flights, as concluded by the *Finch* Case and d) increasing the difference between the future baseline and project case as proposed by York Aviation and agreed by the ExA.

### **Tables 1A, 1B and 1C – Summary of GHG Emissions as submitted by GAL in DCO (MtCO2e)**

**Table 1A. With Project - High ambition scenario**

	Aviation	Surface transport	ABAGO	Construction	Total
CB6	29.32	0.90	0.01	0	30.2
CB7	25.85	0.51	0.01	0	26.4

**Table 1B. Future baseline - High ambition scenario**

	Aviation	Surface transport	ABAGO	Construction	Total
CB6	23.77	0.77	0.01	0.15	24.7
CB7	21.16	0.42	0.01	0	21.6

**Table 1C. Difference**

	Aviation	Surface transport	ABAGO	Construction	Total
CB6	5.56	0.14	0.00	0.15	5.8
CB7	4.69	0.09	0.00	0	4.8

### **Tables 2A, 2B and 2C – Uplift of GHG Emissions (MtCO2e)**

**Table 2A. With Project - High ambition scenario**

	Aviation	Uplift 1. WTT (+20.44%)	Uplift 2. To account for nonCO2 effects as in Jet Zero Strategy	Total aviation (Uplift 1 + Uplift 2)	Surface transport	ABAGO	Construction	Total
CB6	29.32	35.31	58.64	93.96	0.90	0.01	0.00	94.9
CB7	25.85	31.14	51.71	82.85	0.51	0.01	0.00	83.4



**Table 2B. Future baseline - High ambition scenario**

	Aviation	Uplift 1. WTT (+20.44 %)	Uplift 2. To account for nonCO2 effects as in Jet Zero Strategy	Total aviation (Uplift 1 + Uplift 2)	Surface transport	ABAGO	Construction	Total
CB6	23.77	28.62	47.53	76.16	0.77	0.01	0.15	77.1
CB7	21.16	25.49	42.33	67.81	0.42	0.01	0.00	68.2

**Table 2C. Difference**

	Aviation including WTT and non CO2 effects	Uplift 3. Finch Case (consider arriving as well as departing flights)	Uplift 4. York Aviation reset future baseline increases difference from 13 to up to 19mppa. Spread evenly.	Total Aviation impact	Surface transport	ABAGO	Construction	Total
CB6	17.80	35.60	52.03	52.03	0.14	0.00	0.15	52.3
CB7	15.03	30.06	43.94	43.94	0.09	0.00	0.00	44.0

### Tables 3A and 3B Significance of and 2C – Uplift of GHG Emissions (MtCO2e)

**Table 3A. Carbon Budget 6 - against GAL High Ambition Scenario (including non-CO2 effects)**

CB total	CB aviation total	Gatwick total	Gatwick % of overall CB6	Gatwick project uplift	Gatwick project uplift as % of overall CB6
MtCO2e	MtCO2e	MtCO2e	%	MtCO2e	%
944.2	152.8	94.9	10.0%	52.3	5.5%

**Table 3B. Carbon Budget 7 - Balanced Pathway (including non-CO2 effects)**

CB total	CB aviation total	Gatwick total	Gatwick % of overall CB7	Gatwick project uplift	Gatwick project uplift as % of overall CB7
MtCO2e	MtCO2e	MtCO2e	%	MtCO2e	%
525.9	143.7	83.4	15.9%	44.0	8.4%

## **Impact of Worse Case Policy Scenario, comparing GAL assumptions to latest CCC advice.**

Further sensitivity should be carried out for a scenario in which the assumptions made by the Applicant, linked to those made in the Jet Zero Strategy, do not materialise. This should present a 'worst case scenario', and could include the following:

- a) Reducing the rate of efficiency gains from 2% to 1.3%/annum as assumed in the Balanced Pathway by the Climate Change Committee (seventh carbon budget, Table 7.6.1), and includes the shift to zero emission aircraft for some shorter flights; and
- b) Note that the rate of SAF rollout assumed by GAL in their DCO application is higher than in the Jet Zero strategy. For example, GAL assume a 30% SAF roll-out by 2040, compared to 22% in the Jet Zero Strategy; and
- c) Rate of SAF rollout is not as ambitious as that in the Jet Zero Strategy. This reflects concerns raised by the Climate Change Committee on the future SAF rollout in the seventh carbon budget (Table 7.6.1) only meeting 17% by 2040 and 38% by 2050. AEF highlight that the CCC is projecting "*38% less SAF supply in 2040 than the amount expected to be required by the SAF mandate*" due to DfT is 22% of their Jet Zero Trajectory and CCC is 17% of their balanced pathway trajectory.<sup>1</sup>

Comparing for CB7, based on the year 2040:

1. Increase in CO<sub>2</sub> due to reduced level of SAF use in worst-case scenario:
  - Assumed % of SAF for 2040 in GAL submission: 30%
  - Assumed % of SAF for 2040 in JZS: 22%
  - Effective equivalent volume of SAF in 2040 determined by CCC (see above note from AEF, which explains this): 13.6%
  - Overall % reduction in SAF (30-13.6%) = 16.4%
  - Increase in GHG emissions as a result of reduction in SAF = 70% of the above = 11.5%
  - Increase in GHG emissions through reduction in SAF to CCC latest estimate of what is reasonable = 12.9 increase in GHG emissions.
2. Increase in GHG due to reduced annual efficiency improvements in aviation from 2% to 1.3% per annum, leads to a 17.5% lower reduction in fuel efficiency by 2040.

Overall change =  $1.293 \times 1.1175 = 33\%$  increase. **Thus, the worst-case policy scenario would have a 33% increase in emissions compared to the calculations submitted by GAL.** This is reflected in Table 4 below.

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<sup>1</sup> See <https://www.aef.org.uk/2025/05/21/is-there-a-hole-in-sustainable-aviation-fuel-supply/>.

**Table 4. Carbon Budget 7 – Worst Case Policy Scenario (including non-CO2 effects)**

CB total	CB aviation total	Gatwick total	<b>Gatwick % of overall CB7</b>	Gatwick project uplift	<b>Gatwick project uplift as % of overall CB7</b>
MtCO2e	MtCO2e	MtCO2e	%	MtCO2e	%
525.9	143.7	110.7	<b>21.0%</b>	58.5	<b>11.1%</b>

## Annex 2

### **Contrasting level of investment to increase capacity of public transport networks as opposed to strategic road network**

GAL has proposed a significant off-airport investment in the strategic road network of around £350 million. The corresponding investment into rail (£10 million agreed with Network Rail) and wider sustainable travel (£10 million sustainable transport fund) is not sufficient to create comparable increases in sustainable transport capacity. For example, there is no consideration of investment in bus lanes around the airport and no indication as to the level of increase in rail network (as opposed to rail station) capacity that the £10 million rail investment would deliver. Rail investments to increase capacity on the Brighton Mainline would include investment to improve constraints to junctions just north of East Croydon. GACC previously noted GAL's refusal to engage in such investment at Written Representation 8 (*"It might be illustrative of GAL's intent that it refuses to accept, without setting out a reason, any requirement to fund grade separation of Windmill Bridge Junction, which represents a significant infrastructure constraint that might be necessary to address in order to release rail additional capacity to accommodate the demand generated by the project."*)

Earlier studies have highlighted indicative levels of development required. For example, 'Unlocking the Brighton Mainline' (Brighton Mainline Alliance, 2019)<sup>11</sup> proposed fixing the 'Croydon bottleneck' with:

Investment in Selhurst Junction;

Adding two extra platforms at East Croydon;

Other track layout improvements to allow more trains to run including at Norwood junction; and

Later improvements to Gatwick Airport after these have been completed.

This was noted to enable an increase in peak hour trains from 36 to 42-44, which significantly raised capacity including for new services, timetabling options, reliability and resilience improvements.

The Earlier London and South Coast Rail Corridor Study commissioned by the Department of Transport (WSP, 2016)<sup>12</sup> set out similar plans for a 'Brighton Mainline Upgrade package' with a capital cost of £1.2-1.5 billion. This also included proposals to reinstate a rail link between Lewes and Uckfield, and redoubling the line to Uckfield (£150 - £1 billion, or more if redoubling to Uckfield is included) which would increase overall capacity to the South Coast, to offset the potential increased use of the Brighton Mainline if the modal shift targeted by GAL in association with overall growth in passenger numbers is to be realised.

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<sup>11</sup> [https://www.coast2capital.org.uk/storage/downloads/unlocking\\_the\\_brighton\\_mainline-1560266517.pdf](https://www.coast2capital.org.uk/storage/downloads/unlocking_the_brighton_mainline-1560266517.pdf).

<sup>12</sup> <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a74ba3340f0b619c8659f10/london-south-coast-rail-corridor.pdf>.

Other proposals include reopening a line from Selsdon to Lewisham north of Croydon to link to West Anglia and Great Eastern Main lines (estimated at £10-20 billion), and improvements around Tunbridge Wells to link into Kent (options vary from £10m to £250m). In comparison, the commitment of £10 million from Gatwick Airport expansion looks hardly sufficient to reflect the increased capacity utilisation that the airport expects to utilise.

In summary, it would appear that the airport is modelling a modal shift to public transport but is not providing the infrastructure improvements. Not only is this then left to be largely funded by government, but since it is not being brought on with the scheme it risks the Northern Runway Project locking in more car dependency with its overall increase in car travel to/from the airport (even with the increased mode share proposed) and discouraging other modal shift as the rail network on and around the Brighton Mainline is increasingly congested.

GACC also refer the SoS to the final Principal Areas of Disagreement Summary Statement (PADSS) of Network Rail submitted in August 2024. This states that Network Rail's position is that GAL should provide, *"A reasonable and proportionate contribution to the rail network to mitigate the effects of airport-driven growth."* The combination of the Rail Enhancement Fund (GACC previously recommended ensuring this has no maximum figure), Transport Mitigation Fund (£10 million) and Sustainable Transport Fund must ensure sufficient funding for public transport network capacity has been provided. Concerns of the modelled modal shift are still raised by Network Rail on page 7, *"It has not been possible to fully reconcile capacity support assumptions used by Gatwick in the transport assessment with industry planning assumptions"* and on page 8 that, *"These issues have not been fully resolved"* and *"Require there are mechanisms to close this gap in understanding"* and on page 12 where Network Rail comments on the outstanding need to, *"Identify and fund rail initiatives that would support Gatwick in achieving its public transport mode shift targets"* which is agreed due to the *"Rail Enhancement Fund which can be used to fund initiatives which increase rail model share"*.

GACC reiterate our earlier submissions to the ExA, which called for zero increase in car travel associated with any airport expansion, and a commensurate investment in rail, as opposed to road, network capacity.


GACC strongly disagrees with GAL's presumption that capital investment in public transport capacity consistent with the desired and modelled modal shift is out of scope whilst expanding the road network is within scope. This is unbalanced. The sums required for significant enhancement of the rail network are clearly at least comparable to the level of road network investment proposed (£350 million). Expanding the strategic highway network is no more 'outside of GAL's control' than expanding the rail capacity South of London. An honest assessment and allocation of funds to increase the rail network capacity should be within the project's scope. GACC believe that the sum of the Rail Enhancement Fund, Transport Mitigation Fund and Sustainable Transport Fund must be geared to fund network capacity rather than primarily station improvements.

### Annex 3

#### **River Mole Catchment EDM Spill Trends analysis May 2025**

RMRW analysed the 30 Event Duration Monitor (EDM) sites in the River Mole catchment returning data from 2019-2024. Official TWUL data was used, updating where possible RMRW's ongoing use of the TWUL's API data. This data is not just used to report spill duration trends but also as a proxy to highlight vulnerabilities in struggling assets across the Mole catchment. This analysis has been provided to TWUL.

Total EDM duration in the River Mole catchment 2024 was 13,000 hours, the second highest spill duration after 2019. The 2024 spill duration exceeded 2023 at 11,819 hours despite lower rainfall in 2024. The rainfall in the River Mole Catchment is measured at the Charlwood Official Met office. Thus was recorded as 1008 mm in 2024. This was the second highest rainfall after 2023, which was 1031mm. The rainfall in 2019 was 957 mm.




While total spill duration tracks annual rainfall, closer examination shows rainfall does not explain all of the spill trends. For example, in 2024, **67% of sites recorded increased storm overflow duration**. This increase was despite lower rainfall compared to 2023. This suggests STW assets are increasingly struggling to cope. Furthermore, **55% of SPS and CSO EDM sites recorded their highest ever spill duration in 2024**.


In 2024, 69% of sites recorded an increase in EDM spill duration over 2023 despite lower rainfall. Only 6 out of 30 EDM sites in 2024 recorded a decrease in spill duration.

### Focus on spill duration from smaller STWs, SPS and CSO stations:

For the 11 SPS and CSO EDM sites in the catchment, long-term trends show an overall increase in total EDM spill duration between 2019 and 2024. Several show worrying increases over recent years. For example, Ironsbottom recorded 0hrs in 2022, 623hrs in 2023 and 858hrs in 2024. Although a small STW, we include Ironsbottom here as it is not a major receiving STW. Locals report frequent pumping in and around the Ironsbottom site at Sidlow.


Pease Pottage is a pumping station serving the village and M23 service station. Since 2021 it has reported year-on-year increases in spill duration: increasing from 44hrs to 196hrs in 2024. It has recently had to cope with the addition of 600 houses at Woodgate Park. Housing occupation rates correlate closely with these increased spills. In 2015 TWUL responded to developer plans by stating that the network did not have the capacity to cope with the additional housing and would lead to additional spills. The receiving waters of Stanford Brook are small and flow through some of the most valuable woodland habitat in the catchment.





EDM Sites recording <80% online not included.  
Ironsbottom is a small STWs so included here.






Although smaller in volume than STW outfalls, several CSO and SPS EDMs spill into vulnerable receiving waters. For example, Castle Drive SPS in Reigate spills into Norman's Gill a small ditch dry in summer and which flows into local ponds and across farmland to the River Mole. Spills here were 0hrs in 2022, 7hrs in 2023 and 35 hours in 2024. A recent serious pollution incident from Castle Drive SPS killed the fish in the tiny receiving ditch (EA pollution incident).

Most Pumping Stations have no EDM recording installed. For example, Leigh Bridge SPS is responsible for pumping wastewater to Holmwood STWs from Leigh Village. In wet weather sewers frequently surcharge into streets and properties and flow into Leigh Brook. Booms are put out by Lanes Teams during wet weather but this won't stop sewage flowing into streams and watercourses. This means that spills occur from unmonitored pumping stations but are not recorded in the total.

### **EDM Trends in STWs:**

Spill trends in the nine major STWs are more varied. In 2024 over 10,000 hours of spills were recorded from the 9 major STWs in the catchment. This is the second highest spill duration after 2020. More recently, the average STW EDM spill duration has increased by over 70% since 2022. Seven sites reported an increase in spill duration over 2023 despite lower rainfall. Furthermore, four sites recorded their highest EDM spill duration of the entire series 2019-2024: Burstow, Esher, Horley and Leatherhead. Esher in particular shows a worrying upward trend with a 400% increase since 2019. Only 3 sites recorded spill durations lower than average since 2019.

Few sites show any consistent downward trend. Even those reporting lower values than previous peaks, such as Dorking and Earlswood, show increases in recent years.



## Gatwick Airport Expansion

RMRW note the recent agreement (copied below) of TWUL and GAL to model the additional flows from airport expansion to determine decisions on whether TWUL infrastructure can cope. Given the impact of growth and climate change on other TW assets in the catchment outlined above, it is unclear what assurance TWUL can provide that sustainable decisions will be made arising from any modelling that will ensure improvements in performance rather than a continued degradation in asset performance that is still seen in the River Mole catchment? Questions to ask Thames Water:

! **Disconnection from Rainfall:** Why did 67% of EDM sites record increased spill durations in 2024 despite lower rainfall than 2023? What internal assessments explain this divergence?

**Asset Degradation:** How will Thames Water address the 55% of SPS and CSO sites recording their highest-ever spill durations in 2024? What targeted investment is planned?

**Growth Pressure:** Does TW investigations and data agree that developments like Woodgate Park cause growth-led spill increases?

**Monitoring Gaps:** When will TW install EDM monitors at key unmonitored SPS sites such as Leigh Bridge, where known pollution events occur but are not recorded?

**Vulnerable Receiving Waters:** What is TW's strategy to protect sensitive water bodies like Stanford Brook and Norman's Gill from high-impact but low-volume spills?

**STW Performance:** Why have average spill durations at major STWs increased over 70% since 2022, with four sites reaching record durations in 2024? What interventions are planned and are going ahead and do they account for growth and climate change?

**Esher STW:** What is the cause of the 400% increase in spills from Esher STW since 2019, and how will this be reversed?

**Climate and Growth Resilience:** In light of the TWUL – GAL modelling agreement, what binding commitments will TW make to ensure modelling results lead to real infrastructure upgrades that will cope with the challenges of growth and climate change?

Simon Collins

Trustee River Mole River Watch

May 2025

#### **Annex 4**

##### **Extract of Agreement between Gatwick Airport Limited and Thames Water Utilities Ltd (TWUL)**

GAL and TWUL have now agreed a revised form of Requirement 31 in the Draft Development Consent Order (DCO), relating to wastewater capacity and construction sequencing. As TWUL is unable to complete the required hydraulic modelling before the Secretary of State's decision deadline in October 2025, a staged approach is agreed:

Gatwick must provide a development phasing plan with detailed wastewater flow forecasts aligned to projected passenger growth up to ten years after dual runway operations commence.

Hydraulic modelling may be undertaken by Gatwick or TWUL, but must be validated by TWUL, with a dispute resolution mechanism involving an independent Chartered Engineer.

TWUL has 12 months from receipt of the plan to confirm whether its infrastructure can accommodate the increased foul water flows.

Work on new wastewater treatment infrastructure (Work No. 44) or commencement of dual runway operations cannot proceed without TWUL's confirmation of capacity or unless TWUL fails to respond within set time limits. In contrast, if TW fails to respond to GAL the expansion could go ahead with GAL's STW but still a continuation of watercourses being polluted.

END